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SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE
such language should be scrupulously avoided. On the other hand, a
constitutionally permissible search of all airline passengers may be a
desirable result. A decision which upholds the constitutionality of such
searches should stress the limited nature of the invasion of privacy.
Surveys have shown that most airline passengers, the class victim of
weapons searches, welcome them. Passengers feel that the minor in-
convenience of the search is outveighed by the assurance of a safe
flight.20 8 By employing a L ue balancing test which carefully considers
the consequences to the individual victims of a search as well as the
public danger, courts will not only achieve a desirable result but also
a satisfactory legal theory for reaching that result.
AUTHORIZATION OF WIRETAPS
United States v. Pisacano
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968209 legalized, within narrowly defined limits,210 wiretapping by
federal and state authorities in investigating certain types of crimes.2 11
Drawn to comply with constitutional standards enunciated in Berger
v. New York212 and Kutz v. United States,2 18 it provides that authoriza-
tion for the interception of wire or oral communications must be
granted by a federal judge of competent jurisdiction upon an applica-
tion authorized by "[t]he Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney
General specifically designated by the Attorney General."214 According
208 See N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1972, at 73, col. 7.
209 Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 211-223 (partially codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20
(1970)) [hereinafter Title III].
2 1 0 See 18 U.S.C. § 2516, 2518(1)-(8) (1970).
211 All crimes to which Title III is applicable are listed at 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1)(a)-(g)
(1971).
212388 U.S. 41 (1967).
In Berger, a New York statute permitting eavesdropping was declared invalid for want
of "adequate judicial supervision or protective procedure." Id. at 60. Specifically, the
Court objected to the following facts: (1) the warrant required no particularity as to the
specific crime being investigated or anticipated; (2) prolonged eavesdropping would be
"equivalent to a series of intrusions ... pursuant to a single showing of probable cause;"
(3) no termination date for the authorization was required; (4) there was no requirement
for notice as is present in conventional warrants.
213 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Katz suggested that "[a] duly authorized magistrate . . . could constitutionally have
authorized, with appropriate safeguards, the very limited search and seizure that the
Government asserts in fact took place." Id. at 353 (emphasis added). The "limited search
and seizure" referred to was eavesdropping with the use of an electronic device placed on
the top of a public telephone booth regularly used by the defendant.
That the drafters of Title III had the Berqer and Katz decisions in mind is reflected
in the accompanying Senate report: "Title MI was drafted to meet these [constitutional]
standards and to conform-with Katz v. United States. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess., 2 U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD. Nzws, 2153 (1968).
214 18 U.S.C. § 2,516(l) (1970).
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to 28 U.S.C. section 510, meanwhile, the Attorney General may occa-
sionally delegate duties to "any other officer, employee, or agency of
the Department of Justice."2 15
The degree to which the Attorney General's duties under the
wiretap statute may be delegated under 28 U.S.C. section 510 without
rendering invalid applications for authorization for interception of wire
or oral communications in accordance with Title III has been the sub-
ject of a considerable amount of discussion in recent cases. 218 Those
cases include United States v. Pisacano217 where three wiretap authori-
zations were at issue.
In Pisacano, the defendants were the subject of a four-count indict-
ment returned by a grand jury in the Southern District of New York.
The defendants pleaded guilty to count one, which charged a con-
spiracy to violate statutes dealing with interstate racketeering enter-
prises, with the understanding that the other counts, involving
substantive offenses under these sections, would be dismissed on the
date of sentencing. Before the date of sentencing, counsel for two of
the defendants applied for a postponement. This application was denied.
At the time of sentencing, counsel once again moved to postpone
sentencing and also moved for permission to withdraw the guilty pleas
pursuant to Rule 32(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.218
These motions were denied and relatively light sentences were im-
posed.219 On appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the defen-
215 28 U.S.C. § 510 (1966). This secton reads in full:
The Attorney General may from time to time make such provisions as he
considers appropriate authorizing the performance by any other officer, employee,
or agency of the Department of Justice of any function of the Attorney General.
218See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 40 U.S.L.W. 2454 (5th Cir. Jan. 12, 1972);
United States v. Becker, 461 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Mainello, 345 F. Supp.
863 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); United States v. Whitaker, 343 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Pa. 1972), United
States v. Consiglio, 342 F. Supp. 556 (D. Conn. 1972); United States v. Narducci, 341 F.
Supp. 1107 (E.D. Pa. 1972); United States v. Casale, 341 F. Supp. 374 (M.D. Pa. 1972);
United States v. Doolittle, 341 F. Supp. 163 (M.D. Ga. 1972); United States v. D'Amato,
340 F. Supp. 1020 (E.D. Pa. 1972); United States v. Iannelli, 339 F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Pa.
1972); United States v. Aquino, 338 F. Supp. 1080 (E.D. Mich. 1972); United States v.
Baldassari, 338 F. Supp. 904 (M.D. Pa. 1972); United States v Cihal, 336 F. Supp. 261
(W.D. Pa. 1971); United States v. La Gorga, 336 F. Supp. 190 (W.D. Pa. 1971); United
States v. Cantor, 328 F. Supp. 561 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
217 459 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1972).
218 FED. R. Cim. P. 32(d) reads as follows:
A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere may be made
only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but to
correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of
conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his plea.
The discretionary nature of the judge's response to a motion under Rule 32(d) has
been established and reaffirmed in many cases. See note 220 infra.
219 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1961), prohibiting knowing use of wire communication facilities
in transmission of wagering information, provides a maximum penalty of $10,000 fine
and/or two years imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1965), prohibiting interstate or foreign
[Vol. 47:250
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dants contended that the denial of their motions to withdraw the guilty
pleas was an abuse of the judge's discretion.2 20
Chief Judge Friendly, in affirming the order denying defendant's
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, found present none of the grounds
which normally constitute abuse of the trial court's discretion such as
to permit an appellate court to overturn such an order.2 1
The applications to postpone sentencing were made ostensibly to
give the defendants' counsel time to explore the possible ramifications
of the Fifth Circuit decision in United States v. Robinson,2 2 2 decided
travel or commerce in furtherance of unlawful activity, provides a maximum penalty of
$10,000 fine and/or five years imprisonment. The actual sentences imposed for conspiracy
to commit these violations were a $250 fine and two years probation for one defendant
and three year sentences for the other two defendants, of which four months were to be
spent in "jail-type" institutions, the balance of the sentences to be suspended and each
defendant subsequently placed on two years probation.
220 There is virtual unanimity among the circuits that the granting of permission to
withdraw a plea is discretionary with the trial court. See, e.g., United States v. Rawlins,
440 F.2d 1043 (8th Cir. 1971); United States v. Spragg, 439 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Lombardozzi, 436 F.2d 878 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 908 (1971), citing
United States v. Hughes, 825 F.2d 789, 792 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 907 (1964);
United States ex rel. Scott v, Mancusi, 429 F.2d 104 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
909 (1970); Hanson v. Mathews, 424 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1057
(1970); Everett v. United States, 336 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
A guilty plea must be a "knowing, intelligent act done with sufficient awareness of
relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748
(1090). The trial judge has a responsibility for ensuring that such is the case. FED. R.
CMMr. P. 11.
Although "[there is no requirement that a district court enumerate all the rights
which are waived by a plea of guilty in order to determine if it is voluntarily and intel-
ligently made," Taylor v. United States, 452 F.2d 646, 648 (5th Cir. 1971) (footnotes
omitted), nevertheless "[ilt is the duty of a Federal judge to thoroughly investigate the
circumstances under which [the guilty plea] is made." United States v. Lester, 247 F.2d
496, 499 (2d Cir. 1957).
Among the consequences of which the defendant must be aware is ineligibility for
parole. Bye v. United States, 435 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1970). See Second Circuit Note, 46
ST. JOHN's L. Rxv. 502 (1972) and cases cited therein.
Misleading statements by the government, measured by the reasonableness of the
construction placed on them by the defendant, may preclude awareness of circumstances
and consequences requisite for the guilty plea. See United States v. Lester, 247 F.2d 496,
501 (2d Cir. 1957). Likewise, extreme inadequacy or absence of counsel (unless expressly
waived) may also invalidate a guilty plea. Woodall v. Neil, 444 F.2d 92 (6th Cir. 1971);
Cardarella v. United States, 375 F.2d 222, 230 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 882
(1967); Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1965); Kadwell v. United States, 315 F.2d
667 (9th Cir. 1963); Poole v. United States, 250 F.2d 396 (D.C. Cir. 1957); United States ex
rel. Feeley v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1948).
Acceptance of a guilty plea, or a refusal to allow withdrawal of a guilty plea, under
circumstances such as these would possibly constitute an abuse of discretion.
221 Chief Judge Friendly stated that it would be an abuse of discretion for a judge to
refuse to allow withdrawal of a plea (I) if the prosecutor intentionally remained silent,
knowing that the case against the defendants rested mainly on inadmissible evidence, or
(2) if the guilty pleas were vitiated by non-compliance with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, or (3) "if, on the facts before him, a conviction thereon could not
survive a collateral attack." However, he felt that none of those circumstances were
present in this case.
222 468 F-9d 189 (1972).
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after the pleas of guilty in Pisacano were announced but prior to the
date of the sentence.223
In Robinson, the designation of the Assistant Attorney General to
authorize the application for the wiretap was made by the Executive
Assistant to the Attorney General of the United States, while 18 U.S.C.
section 2516(1) mandates that such designation be done by the Attorney
General himself. The Government sought to justify this by referring
to 28 U.S.C. section 510.224 The Robinson court rejected this contention
on the ground that since section 510 was already in effect when section
2516(1) was enacted, the specific language of the latter statute must
have been intended to operate as a limit on section 510 with regard to
authorization for wiretaps.225
Of the three wiretap authorizations at issue in Pisacano, two were
approved by the Attorney General himself, one by an initialed memo-
randum, and the other by specific telephone authorizations. As to the
third, the Executive Assistant affixed the Attorney General's initials.
Chief Judge Friendly indicated that this satisfied Congress' intent, in
that "the Attorney General assumed full responsibility for what was
done even if he did not act himself in every case." 226 He concluded that
"the Justice Department's procedures were very likely consistent with
the mandate of section 2516(1) '' 227 in that "that procedure does . . .
ensure that the responsible official be reasonably identifiable."228
In addition, Chief Judge Friendly stated, "[w]e are... not at all
convinced that if this case had gone to trial and the court had refused
to suppress evidence obtained by the wiretaps, we would have re-
versed."229 Although dictum, the Chief Judge here strongly indicates
223 The announcement of the Pisacano defendants' intention to plead guilty was made
on January 5, 1972. Robinson was decided on January 12. The date of sentence in
Pisacano was scheduled to be February 15. 459 F.2d at 261.
224 See note 215 supra.
225 Further, the legislative history of Title III clearly envisions the responsibility for
authorizing wiretaps resting on an identifiable individual. S. REP, No. 1097, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess., 2 U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD. NEWS, 2185, 2189 (1968). It was held by the Robinson
court that the "congressional scheme was severely undercut" by the procedure used, par-
ticularly in view of the additional fact that Deputy Assistant Attorney General subscribed
the Assistant's name on the letters authorizing the application for the wiretaps in ques-
tion.
The Robinson court concluded that "[s]ince the evidence used to convict these
defendants . . . eventuated from these improperly authorized wiretaps, it follows that
such evidence ought to have been suppressed," 468 F.2d at 194, and since "without
the evidence which must be suppressed, there is nothing in the record on which the con-
victions may stand," id., the judgments of conviction must be reversed.
226 459 F.2d at 263.
227 Id. at 264 n.5.
228 Id.
229 Id. at 264.
[Vol. 47:250
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that the Second Circuit does not consider the procedures used by the
Justice Department to be inconsistent with the mandates of Title III.
Lest it be inferred that there is an irreconcilable split between the
Second and Fifth Circuits, it should be pointed out that even the
Robinson court noted that "direct authorization (by the Executive
Assistant) would have ensured that the application was deemed war-
ranted in this particular case and was not 'routinely' made by the
Assistant Attorney General's deputy, 'in conformity with the standard
procedure.' ",230
The cases in which this issue has arisen have shown a myriad of
possible factual and procedural situations. 31 Hard and fast rules are
230 468 F.2d at 193. Justice Clark writing the opinion in Robinson, apparently per-
ceived conflicting expressions of congressional intent with regard to Title I. On the one
hand, there is the intent that responsibility for authorizing wiretaps be fixed on an identi-
fiable individual. S. REP,. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD. NEWS,
2185, 2189 (1968), and, on the other, that such matters be handled by a "publicly responsi-
ble official subject on the political process" (id. at 2185, interpreted to mean "an individual
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate." 468 F.2d at 192). Thus, Justice
Clark suggests that direct authorization by the Executive Assistant would have satisfied
the intent that responsibility be fixed and traceable to an identifiable individual. How-
ever, whether such authorization would satisfy the second intent would only be decided
if this factual situation actually arose and Justice Clark indicates that it should not: "[i]f
the load on [the Attorney General] is to be lessened, such relief must come from Congress."
Id. at 194.
231 See cases cited supra note 216. In a majority of the cases, this issue arose in the
context of a pre-tria motion to supress evidence: United States v. Whitaker, 343 F. Supp.
358 (E.D. Pa. 1972); United States v. Consiglio, 342 F. Supp. 556 (D. Conn. 1972); United
States v. Casale, 341 F. Supp. 374 (M.D. Pa. 1972); United States v. Doolittle, 341 F. Supp.
163 (M.D. Ga. 1972); United States v. D'Amato, 340 F. Supp. 1020 (E.D. Pa. 1972); United
States v. Baldassari, 338 F. Supp. 904 (M.D. Pa. 1972); United States v. Cihal, 336 F. Supp.
261 (W.D. Pa. 1971). In United States v. Robinson, 40 U.S.L.W. 2454 (5th Cir. Jan. 12,
1972) and United States v. Becker, 461 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1972), it arose in a motion to
overturn a conviction. In Pisacano, it arose in a motion to withdraw guilty pleas. In
United States v. Mainello, 345 F. Supp. 863 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), it arose in a post-trial motion
to suppress evidence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10). Finally, there are instances where
the reported opinion does not indicate the procedural context in which the issue arose:
United States v. Narducci, 341 F. Supp. 1107 (E.D. Pa. 1972); United States v. lannelli, 339
F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Pa. 1972); United States v. Aquino, 338 F. Supp. 1080 (ED. Mich.
1972); United States v. La Gorga, 336 F. Supp. 190 (W.D. Pa. 1971); United States v. Cantor,
328 F. Supp. 561 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
In every non-Second Circuit case in which the Executive Assistant subscribed the At-
torney General's initials to the delegation of authority to approve wiretap applications to
an Assistant Attorney General, it was ruled that evidence so derived could not be used:
United States v. Robinson, 468 F.2d 189 (1972); United States v. Narducci, 341 F. Supp.
1107 (ED. Pa. 1972); United States v. Baldassari, 338 F. Supp. 904 (M.D. Pa. 1972); United
States v. Cihal, 336 F. Supp. 261 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
The Pisacano decision has been followed within the Second Circuit with regard to
situations in which the Attorney General's initials to the delegation of authority were
subscribed by his Executive Assistant: United States v. Becker, 461 F.2d 230 (2d Cir.
1972); United States v. Mainello, 345 F. Supp. 863 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). In Mainello, however,
it is noted that, "[w]ere it not for the recent Second Circuit decisions in this area, it might
have been successfully argued that the ... application authorized by Lindenbaum [the
Executive Assistant] was defective." 345 F.2d at 880 n.66. The question was made moot in
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not easily derived where such a variety of possible situations exist, and
it may be that varying factual situations will give rise to varying re-
sults even within a particular court. Nevertheless, the letter and spirit
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act appears to have
been more closely followed by the Fifth Circuit in Robinson than by
the Second Circuit in Pisacano.
The doctrine of separation of powers provides the judiciary with
an essential role: to identify, prevent, and correct abuses of laws man-
dated by Congress. In performing this role, its attitude should be one of
vigilance, rather than acquiescence. Every case decided outside of the
Second Circuit in which the Executive Assistant subscribed the At-
torney General's initials to the authorization to approve a wiretap ap-
plication has read literally the requirement that an "Assistant Attorney
General [be] specifically designated by the Attorney General." 232 This
requirement is not satisfied when such designation of an Assistant
Attorney General is made, not by the Attorney General himself, but
by his Executive Assistant affixing his initials.28 In holding to the con-
trary, the Second Circuit has taken a unique position, and one of
dubious validity.
GRAND JURY'S RIGHT TO DEMAND HANDWRITING EXEMPLARS
United States v. Doe (Schwartz)
The fourth amendment protects individuals against unwarranted
intrusions by the government into their private lives and personal
that case by the conclusion that defendant's guilt was established on the basis of evidence
obtained through wiretaps authorized by the Attorney General himself. Id.
Nearly all of the cases in which the Attorney General himself initialed the memoran-
dum delegating to the Assistant Attorney General authority to approve wiretap applica-
tions held that the evidence so derived was not obtained in violation of Congressional
mandate and could therefore be used: Pisacano; United States v. Becker, 461 F.2d 230 (2d
Cir. 1972); United States v. Mainello, 345 F. Supp. 863 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); United States v.
Whitaker, 843 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Pa. 1972); United States v. Consiglio, 342 F. Supp. 556(D. Conn. 1972) (citing Pisacano as "laying down the rule of the law to be followed in this
Circuit on such matters," Id. at 558); United States v. Doolittle, 841 F. Supp. 163 (M.D.
Ga. 1972); United States v. D'Amato, 340 F. Supp. 1020 (E.D. Pa. 1972); United States v.
lannelli, 339 F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Pa. 1972); United States v. La Gorga, 336 F. Supp. 190(W.D. Pa. 1971); United States v. Cantor, 328 F. Supp. 561 (ED. Pa. 1971).
The lone exception was United States v. Casale, 341 F. Supp. 374 (M.D. Pa. 1972), in
which it was held that the signing of the Assistant Attorney General's name to the applica-
tion for a court order to wiretap by the Assistant's Deputy violated the procedure man-
dated by § 2516(l), and that the memorandum designating the Assistant Attorney General
to authorize the particular application would not suffice to satisfactorily authorize the
application itself.
In United States v. Aquino, 338 F. Supp. 1080 (E.D. Mich. 1972), there were two
memoranda at issue, one initialed by the Attorney General, the other by the Executive
Assistant. As to each the court followed the majority rulings outlined above.
232 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1).
28$ See note 230 supra.
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